737 Max Airliners Ordered Immediately Grounded in the US

NickH

Dank Meme
I'd be interested to see how long this lasts. Right now, Boeing is churning out 57 a month. That's a lot of airplanes to fly straight to Mojave... But that aside, that's a lot of skilled workers facing a layoff if this continues. Seattle has a very fragile economy, thanks to some very poor planing in recent years. It may sound like it's just one product, from one manufacturer, but all the eggs really are in one basket, with both the type and the company, and six months could be devastating to the area.
 

Autothrust Blue

The frakkin’ CAG
I'd be interested to see how long this lasts. Right now, Boeing is churning out 57 a month. That's a lot of airplanes to fly straight to Mojave... But that aside, that's a lot of skilled workers facing a layoff if this continues. Seattle has a very fragile economy, thanks to some very poor planing in recent years. It may sound like it's just one product, from one manufacturer, but all the eggs really are in one basket, with both the type and the company, and six months could be devastating to the area.
-takes deep breath-

THEN FIX THE FRAKKING AIRPLANE!
 

Murdoughnut

Well sized member
A friend of mine who works in airport consulting keeps posting links to thinks suggesting that crew training/ability are responsible. To be honest, I think there's a bit of racism mixed in there - or if not racism, simply an attitude of "western pilots wouldn't allow this to happen."

He forwarded this post by a WestJet captain on the 73 - I leave it here without opinion but merely for your consideration:

Commentary of Boeing B737-MAX

Hi family and friends,

I am receiving many calls about these accidents and I want to dispel some rumours and assure folks that the skies are still friendly and safe.

I feel it is time to say something about the two tragic accidents involving the Boeing 737-8 (MAX). There is so much mis-information and speculation into the second accident that is quite frankly sends me spinning. Both these accidents are a tragic loss of life. But first of all, I was not part of the accident investigation and I was not flying the airplane… this is my analyses based on the information I have today.

This is not going to be a short discussion and unfortunately, I will still have to gloss over aspects and cannot provide in depth explanation to some elements of this.

I am a Captain on the B737-600/700/800 NG and on the Boeing 737-8 (MAX) with a total time of nearly 20,000hrs. The airplane is safe if operated according to the Flight Operations Manual and the manufacture (Boeing).

I believe and, in my opinion only, that the LION AIR 1610 (LNI610) crash in Indonesian and the recent Ethiopian crash were senseless and could have easily been prevented with a sound knowledge and understanding of the systems and a sound knowledge of the emergency procedures and adequate and sound emergency procedure training (in my opinion WestJet satisfies this).

Let’s start with the Lion Air crash. The aircraft flew the day before with a different crew and suffered the exact same malfunction but the crew handled it in a professional manner and following proper procedure and brought the aircraft to a safe landing. The aircraft went into maintenance that night and the same malfunction happened the next day (yes!) where it was mishandled resulting in the crash.

Had Lion Air and Ethiopian followed procedures to disengage the stabilizer trim according to our flight operations manual and the like the previous flight, these tragedies would not have happened (bold statement I know but my opinion).

Disabling the stabilizer trim from an uncommanded stabilizer movement is such an elementary manoeuvre which every 737 pilot should know. This emergency procure is a memory recall checklist (must be executed from memory without reference to a checklist) Boeing believes this is a must know procedure! A well-trained pilot should have had no problem dealing with the issues the Lion Air/Ethiopian 737-MAX8 experienced.

https://theaircurrent.com/…/what-is-the-boeing-737-max-man…/

The problem was attributed to the MCAS system, a piece of software running in the background and was installed because of the new engines on the B737-MAX8. Do I need to know much about MCAS? Not really, I don’t need to know how an engine works to start or shut it down, all I know is that if the stabilizer trim runs away uncommanded, I know how to stop it.

Located on the centre pedestal of the is the Stabilizer Trim Cutout switches and they operate this way:
CUTOUT – deactivates main electric and autopilot trim operation.

The STAB TRIM PRI cutout switch and the STAB TRIM B/U cutout switch are
located on the control stand. If either switch is positioned to CUTOUT, both the
autopilot and main electric trim inputs are disconnected from the stabilizer trim
motor.

In November of 2018 Boeing issued a Safety Bulletin titled:

B737MAX Uncommanded Nose Down Stabilizer Trim Due to Erroneous Angle of Attack (AOA)
During Manual Flight Only… and distributed to all operators of the B737-MAX8

The first paragraph states: In the event of erroneous AOA data, the pitch trim system can trim the
stabilizer nose down in increments lasting up to 10 seconds. The nose down stabilizer trim movement can be stopped and reversed with the use of the electric stabilizer trim switches, but may restart 5 seconds after the electric stabilizer trim switches are released. Repetitive cycles of uncommanded nose down stabilizer continue to occur unless the stabilizer trim system is deactivated through use of both STAB TRIM CUTOUT switches in accordance with the newly revised procedures in the attached Runaway Stabilizer QRC. It is possible for the stabilizer to reach the nose down limit unless the system inputs are counteracted completely by pilot trim inputs and both STAB TRIM CUTOUT switches are moved to CUTOUT.

This action can be seen if the flight data is analyzed as reported in the preliminary report found here:

https://www.flightradar24.com/…/2018-035-PK-LQP-Preliminary…

I have attached a video showing the stabilizer trim system and the operation of the stab trim cutout switches.
Once again, I would not hesitate to operate the MAX and I would not do anything that would be unsafe or risk lives. If anyone wants to discuss technical aspects that I have glossed over… give me a call, I’m a slow typer.
 

AM011309

Well-Known Member
Not a pilot so forgive me ...

So I agree that recovering from runaway trim should be something second nature, but reading his letter he mentioned they both did this after erroneous AOA data. That seems to be the bigger issue that needs to be fixed. I mean yeah know how to deal with it if it happens but is that something that commonly happens? Again, non pilot here so if this is a dumb question , well... sorry.
 

Derg

Cap, Roci
Staff member
A friend of mine who works in airport consulting keeps posting links to thinks suggesting that crew training/ability are responsible. To be honest, I think there's a bit of racism mixed in there - or if not racism, simply an attitude of "western pilots wouldn't allow this to happen."

He forwarded this post by a WestJet captain on the 73 - I leave it here without opinion but merely for your consideration:

Commentary of Boeing B737-MAX

Hi family and friends,

I am receiving many calls about these accidents and I want to dispel some rumours and assure folks that the skies are still friendly and safe.

I feel it is time to say something about the two tragic accidents involving the Boeing 737-8 (MAX). There is so much mis-information and speculation into the second accident that is quite frankly sends me spinning. Both these accidents are a tragic loss of life. But first of all, I was not part of the accident investigation and I was not flying the airplane… this is my analyses based on the information I have today.

This is not going to be a short discussion and unfortunately, I will still have to gloss over aspects and cannot provide in depth explanation to some elements of this.

I am a Captain on the B737-600/700/800 NG and on the Boeing 737-8 (MAX) with a total time of nearly 20,000hrs. The airplane is safe if operated according to the Flight Operations Manual and the manufacture (Boeing).

I believe and, in my opinion only, that the LION AIR 1610 (LNI610) crash in Indonesian and the recent Ethiopian crash were senseless and could have easily been prevented with a sound knowledge and understanding of the systems and a sound knowledge of the emergency procedures and adequate and sound emergency procedure training (in my opinion WestJet satisfies this).

Let’s start with the Lion Air crash. The aircraft flew the day before with a different crew and suffered the exact same malfunction but the crew handled it in a professional manner and following proper procedure and brought the aircraft to a safe landing. The aircraft went into maintenance that night and the same malfunction happened the next day (yes!) where it was mishandled resulting in the crash.

Had Lion Air and Ethiopian followed procedures to disengage the stabilizer trim according to our flight operations manual and the like the previous flight, these tragedies would not have happened (bold statement I know but my opinion).

Disabling the stabilizer trim from an uncommanded stabilizer movement is such an elementary manoeuvre which every 737 pilot should know. This emergency procure is a memory recall checklist (must be executed from memory without reference to a checklist) Boeing believes this is a must know procedure! A well-trained pilot should have had no problem dealing with the issues the Lion Air/Ethiopian 737-MAX8 experienced.

https://theaircurrent.com/…/what-is-the-boeing-737-max-man…/

The problem was attributed to the MCAS system, a piece of software running in the background and was installed because of the new engines on the B737-MAX8. Do I need to know much about MCAS? Not really, I don’t need to know how an engine works to start or shut it down, all I know is that if the stabilizer trim runs away uncommanded, I know how to stop it.

Located on the centre pedestal of the is the Stabilizer Trim Cutout switches and they operate this way:
CUTOUT – deactivates main electric and autopilot trim operation.

The STAB TRIM PRI cutout switch and the STAB TRIM B/U cutout switch are
located on the control stand. If either switch is positioned to CUTOUT, both the
autopilot and main electric trim inputs are disconnected from the stabilizer trim
motor.

In November of 2018 Boeing issued a Safety Bulletin titled:

B737MAX Uncommanded Nose Down Stabilizer Trim Due to Erroneous Angle of Attack (AOA)
During Manual Flight Only… and distributed to all operators of the B737-MAX8

The first paragraph states: In the event of erroneous AOA data, the pitch trim system can trim the
stabilizer nose down in increments lasting up to 10 seconds. The nose down stabilizer trim movement can be stopped and reversed with the use of the electric stabilizer trim switches, but may restart 5 seconds after the electric stabilizer trim switches are released. Repetitive cycles of uncommanded nose down stabilizer continue to occur unless the stabilizer trim system is deactivated through use of both STAB TRIM CUTOUT switches in accordance with the newly revised procedures in the attached Runaway Stabilizer QRC. It is possible for the stabilizer to reach the nose down limit unless the system inputs are counteracted completely by pilot trim inputs and both STAB TRIM CUTOUT switches are moved to CUTOUT.

This action can be seen if the flight data is analyzed as reported in the preliminary report found here:

https://www.flightradar24.com/…/2018-035-PK-LQP-Preliminary…

I have attached a video showing the stabilizer trim system and the operation of the stab trim cutout switches.
Once again, I would not hesitate to operate the MAX and I would not do anything that would be unsafe or risk lives. If anyone wants to discuss technical aspects that I have glossed over… give me a call, I’m a slow typer.
This is what baffles me.

(1) The malfunction is a known-issue and needs to be rectified.
(2) The “Oh, we’re too smart for that to happen here” is clap trap.

Everyone seems to admit that “Houston, we have a problem” except for a handful of prideful NIMBY pilots.

“Well, if that were me, I’d calmly put down my coffee and in a split second would have recognized and reacted perfectly, then I would have...” BITCH YOU WEREN’T THERE! :)
 

Cessnaflyer

Wooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooo
A friend of mine who works in airport consulting keeps posting links to thinks suggesting that crew training/ability are responsible. To be honest, I think there's a bit of racism mixed in there - or if not racism, simply an attitude of "western pilots wouldn't allow this to happen."

He forwarded this post by a WestJet captain on the 73 - I leave it here without opinion but merely for your consideration:

Commentary of Boeing B737-MAX

Hi family and friends,

I am receiving many calls about these accidents and I want to dispel some rumours and assure folks that the skies are still friendly and safe.

I feel it is time to say something about the two tragic accidents involving the Boeing 737-8 (MAX). There is so much mis-information and speculation into the second accident that is quite frankly sends me spinning. Both these accidents are a tragic loss of life. But first of all, I was not part of the accident investigation and I was not flying the airplane… this is my analyses based on the information I have today.

This is not going to be a short discussion and unfortunately, I will still have to gloss over aspects and cannot provide in depth explanation to some elements of this.

I am a Captain on the B737-600/700/800 NG and on the Boeing 737-8 (MAX) with a total time of nearly 20,000hrs. The airplane is safe if operated according to the Flight Operations Manual and the manufacture (Boeing).

I believe and, in my opinion only, that the LION AIR 1610 (LNI610) crash in Indonesian and the recent Ethiopian crash were senseless and could have easily been prevented with a sound knowledge and understanding of the systems and a sound knowledge of the emergency procedures and adequate and sound emergency procedure training (in my opinion WestJet satisfies this).

Let’s start with the Lion Air crash. The aircraft flew the day before with a different crew and suffered the exact same malfunction but the crew handled it in a professional manner and following proper procedure and brought the aircraft to a safe landing. The aircraft went into maintenance that night and the same malfunction happened the next day (yes!) where it was mishandled resulting in the crash.

Had Lion Air and Ethiopian followed procedures to disengage the stabilizer trim according to our flight operations manual and the like the previous flight, these tragedies would not have happened (bold statement I know but my opinion).

Disabling the stabilizer trim from an uncommanded stabilizer movement is such an elementary manoeuvre which every 737 pilot should know. This emergency procure is a memory recall checklist (must be executed from memory without reference to a checklist) Boeing believes this is a must know procedure! A well-trained pilot should have had no problem dealing with the issues the Lion Air/Ethiopian 737-MAX8 experienced.

https://theaircurrent.com/…/what-is-the-boeing-737-max-man…/

The problem was attributed to the MCAS system, a piece of software running in the background and was installed because of the new engines on the B737-MAX8. Do I need to know much about MCAS? Not really, I don’t need to know how an engine works to start or shut it down, all I know is that if the stabilizer trim runs away uncommanded, I know how to stop it.

Located on the centre pedestal of the is the Stabilizer Trim Cutout switches and they operate this way:
CUTOUT – deactivates main electric and autopilot trim operation.

The STAB TRIM PRI cutout switch and the STAB TRIM B/U cutout switch are
located on the control stand. If either switch is positioned to CUTOUT, both the
autopilot and main electric trim inputs are disconnected from the stabilizer trim
motor.

In November of 2018 Boeing issued a Safety Bulletin titled:

B737MAX Uncommanded Nose Down Stabilizer Trim Due to Erroneous Angle of Attack (AOA)
During Manual Flight Only… and distributed to all operators of the B737-MAX8

The first paragraph states: In the event of erroneous AOA data, the pitch trim system can trim the
stabilizer nose down in increments lasting up to 10 seconds. The nose down stabilizer trim movement can be stopped and reversed with the use of the electric stabilizer trim switches, but may restart 5 seconds after the electric stabilizer trim switches are released. Repetitive cycles of uncommanded nose down stabilizer continue to occur unless the stabilizer trim system is deactivated through use of both STAB TRIM CUTOUT switches in accordance with the newly revised procedures in the attached Runaway Stabilizer QRC. It is possible for the stabilizer to reach the nose down limit unless the system inputs are counteracted completely by pilot trim inputs and both STAB TRIM CUTOUT switches are moved to CUTOUT.

This action can be seen if the flight data is analyzed as reported in the preliminary report found here:

https://www.flightradar24.com/…/2018-035-PK-LQP-Preliminary…

I have attached a video showing the stabilizer trim system and the operation of the stab trim cutout switches.
Once again, I would not hesitate to operate the MAX and I would not do anything that would be unsafe or risk lives. If anyone wants to discuss technical aspects that I have glossed over… give me a call, I’m a slow typer.
I'd love to see this guy in the same situation. I have a feeling he might be a smoking hole as well.
 

SeanD

Well-Known Member
In relation to what the Lion jumpseater who saved the plane a day prior to the one that crashed. How did he know how to correct it and why didn’t the crew flying know that procedure? I wonder how many tests Boeing had to run to discover this procedure. “Ok, now let’s find the non lethal combination of engine inputs”
 

Cherokee_Cruiser

Well-Known Member
In relation to what the Lion jumpseater who saved the plane a day prior to the one that crashed. How did he know how to correct it and why didn’t the crew flying know that procedure? I wonder how many tests Boeing had to run to discover this procedure. “Ok, now let’s find the non lethal combination of engine inputs”
Could be many reasons. My guess is the JSer only saw a 'constantly' spinning trim wheel and made that call. But the pilots fighting the MCAS were preoccupied and MCAS nose down activation was countered with nose up trim switch on the yoke that successfully brough the nose up. From a tactile perspective, I don't think the crew perceived as a continuous stab trim runaway in which to apply that procedure.
 
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