1500 hour rule...anyone?

ATN_Pilot

Socialist Pig Member
#21
Negative. The captain paid his way in to the right seat at Gulfstream with less than 300 hours. He was then hired at Colgan with about 650.
What does that have to do with the time of the crash? He had thousands of hours then and a type rating. Don't get me wrong, I'm very much in favor of the 1,500 hour rule, but not because of the Colgan crash. That was just the opportunity to push it through.
 

SrFnFly227

Well-Known Member
#22
What does that have to do with the time of the crash? He had thousands of hours then and a type rating. Don't get me wrong, I'm very much in favor of the 1,500 hour rule, but not because of the Colgan crash. That was just the opportunity to push it through.
I wasn't advocating either way with that post. I was just pointing out that the person I quoted was incorrect when he said the Captain was hired with more than 1500 hours.

But since you asked, I personally believe that the ATP law would have resulted in one of two things. One, he would proven himself to be a bad pilot and been weeded out of the system well before making it to an airline. Two, he would have become a better pilot while instructing or flying pipeline, checks, survey, skydivers, etc for the 1300 hours until he could earn an ATP.

People will always argue that those things don't prep a pilot to become an airline pilot. That may be true, but the Buffalo accident wasn't a CRM issue. It wasn't a failure to understand company material or procedures. It was a basic lack of flying ability that was a direct result of the path that he was allowed to take to an airliner. A path that is no longer available because of the ATP law.
 

ATN_Pilot

Socialist Pig Member
#23
I wasn't advocating either way with that post. I was just pointing out that the person I quoted was incorrect when he said the Captain was hired with more than 1500 hours.

But since you asked, I personally believe that the ATP law would have resulted in one of two things. One, he would proven himself to be a bad pilot and been weeded out of the system well before making it to an airline. Two, he would have become a better pilot while instructing or flying pipeline, checks, survey, skydivers, etc for the 1300 hours until he could earn an ATP.

People will always argue that those things don't prep a pilot to become an airline pilot. That may be true, but the Buffalo accident wasn't a CRM issue. It wasn't a failure to understand company material or procedures. It was a basic lack of flying ability that was a direct result of the path that he was allowed to take to an airliner. A path that is no longer available because of the ATP law.
I don't think there's any evidence to support that. My personal experience as a captain flying with industry newbies was that many 300 hour pilots were far better pilots than the 2,000 hour guys. It all comes down to quality of training, attitude, etc. An arbitrary hour requirement is never going to do anything to weed out bad pilots. It does reduce supply, though, which is great for collective bargaining. So I'm all in favor it. :)
 

CFI A&P

Exploring the world one toilet at a time.
#24
Make it a 15,000 hour rule and I'll start whining, too. Until then, no negotiation, no surrender. There are plenty of certificated pilots...call me when Physicians are giving up their practices to use their FAA license as a primary income source.
Dick Karl comes to mind, It wasn’t his primary income but he retired from medicine to play charter pilot for a couple years. I stopped paying attention when many of his articles were him complaining about the TBO costs of his cabin class twin turbine airplane.
 

ATN_Pilot

Socialist Pig Member
#25
A lot of people complained about those articles, but as someone who's thinking of going turbine, I loved them. Remember, the magazine appeals to a broad range of GA.
 
#29
Negative. The captain paid his way in to the right seat at Gulfstream with less than 300 hours. He was then hired at Colgan with about 650.
You are correct. The point was, those pilots weren't inexperienced at the time of the accident, at least not how the 1500 hr rule arbitrarily defines experience. In the case of the captain, he was just borderline incompetent and he had apparently had enough of a negative reputation at the company that management knew him by name, including doubts as to whether he should have been flying the Q400 prior to the crash. I'll give the FO the benefit of the doubt, but she made some mistakes of her own and was fatigued.
 

Richman

Well-Known Member
#31
The 1,500 hour rule works, but not in the way that a layman or the uninitiated would think.

Essentially, in the civilian track, it acts as a vetting process. If you make it the 1,200 hours or so to get to 1,500, acting as a PIC making the hard calls and learning to say "no", rather than letting the captain and autopilot do the work, then the chances are you'll do ok. People who have problems generally get weeded out by some combination of employer, FAA or self-extinguishment issues.

Sure, there are some 600 hour pilots out there that are good sticks, but this game is about so much more than that. More often or not I've seen the low time good sticks quickly overwhelmed when the decision points start adding up in the queue, and they lose focus rapidly.

There are always exceptions, but in this case, the bell curve solution works darn well.
 

Richman

Well-Known Member
#33
Show me the data set that generated your supposed bell curve.
Well, aside from the SWA incident (hardly a pilot induced issue), there have been no passenger fatalities on 121 operators since the rule went into effect.

The only casualties have been low time wannabes that had fheir cheese temporarily moved and flight school operators and similar interests all cranky that they can't sell the dream the way they used to.

Correlation is not causation, but hey, I'll take it.

Even ALPA thinks so...

http://www.alpa.org/news-and-events/news-room/2017-07-21-asf-recap

The civilian pipeline is all messed up for lots of reasons other than the 1,500 hour rule. The wholesale poaching of CFIs in the late 2000's is only one of them. The 1,500 hour rule would have prevented that as well.
 

ATN_Pilot

Socialist Pig Member
#34
So, no data set and no bell curve. And since airline fatalities were already a very rare event, ascribing the current stretch to the 1500 hour rule is almost as crazy as Trump ascribing it to himself. It's likely just a statistical outlier.

"Even ALPA thinks so" probably isn't the best defense, either, since ALPA's position on this is entirely about creating a shortage, not because there's data to support it from a safety aspect. Remember, I was on the Council back when this rule was being discussed and implemented. None of us were sitting around looking at safety data when we were talking about it. But it sure was a great way to restrict supply!
 

Seggy

Well-Known Member
#35
So, no data set and no bell curve. And since airline fatalities were already a very rare event, ascribing the current stretch to the 1500 hour rule is almost as crazy as Trump ascribing it to himself. It's likely just a statistical outlier.

"Even ALPA thinks so" probably isn't the best defense, either, since ALPA's position on this is entirely about creating a shortage, not because there's data to support it from a safety aspect. Remember, I was on the Council back when this rule was being discussed and implemented. None of us were sitting around looking at safety data when we were talking about it. But it sure was a great way to restrict supply!
As accidents are so rare, it is pretty telling that the last three fatal US flagged accidents attributed to pilot error have had a Gulfstreamer behind the controls...
 

ATN_Pilot

Socialist Pig Member
#36
If accidents are so rare, it’s pretty telling that the last three fatal US flagged accidents attributed to pilot error have had a Gulfstreamer behind the controls...
Not really true, since none of those accidents were Gulfstream accidents. The king daddy of them all, 3701, had a TSA pilot at the controls, who then became a Gulfstream street captain, not a low time guy, and then went to Pinnacle. So while it's convenient for you to pretend that's the case, the facts don't fit it.

It's important to note that Gulfstream never had a fatal accident, or even a serious accident of any kind, in all its years of operation.
 

Seggy

Well-Known Member
#38
So, no data set and no bell curve. And since airline fatalities were already a very rare event, ascribing the current stretch to the 1500 hour rule is almost as crazy as Trump ascribing it to himself. It's likely just a statistical outlier.

"Even ALPA thinks so" probably isn't the best defense, either, since ALPA's position on this is entirely about creating a shortage, not because there's data to support it from a safety aspect. Remember, I was on the Council back when this rule was being discussed and implemented. None of us were sitting around looking at safety data when we were talking about it. But it sure was a great way to restrict supply!
Oh, I was also on the council at the time and there was a lot of safety aspects being discussed and implemented around the 1500 hour rule.

Stop kidding yourself.
 

ATN_Pilot

Socialist Pig Member
#39
Oh, I was also on the council at the time and there was a lot of safety aspects being discussed and implemented around the 1500 hour rule.

Stop kidding yourself.
This is a flat out lie. I can see why you're telling it, but you know it's simply not true.
 
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